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1. Introduction   
Overall confidence and stability in the Malaysian financial sector has been preserved 
throughout the period of the global financial crisis, underpinned by a strong financial sector 
and negligible exposure to subprime-related assets and affected counterparties. Ample 
liquidity in the financial system also mitigated the risk of systemic contagion, thus allowing 
the financial sector to continue providing financial intermediation and services to the 
economy at large. Successful reforms of the financial sector following the Asian financial 
crisis have further reinforced the strong fundamentals supporting a sound financial sector in 
Malaysia. 
As a highly open economy, Malaysia was, however, not insulated from the global economic 
downturn. The deterioration in global economic conditions and the major correction in 
commodity prices in the second half of 2008 saw Malaysia’s GDP moderate to 0.1% in the 
final quarter of 2008. The domestic economy experienced the full impact of the global 
recession in the first quarter of 2009, declining by 6.2%. The concerted and pre-emptive 
measures taken by the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), through the accelerated 
implementation of fiscal stimulus measures, supported by the easing of monetary policy and 
the introduction of comprehensive measures to sustain access to financing and mitigate any 
impact of the heightened risk aversion among banks contributed towards stabilising the 
domestic economy in the second quarter and its subsequent recovery in the second half of 
the year. The economy resumed its growth momentum in the fourth quarter, growing by 
4.4%. This resulted in the economy contracting by only 1.7% in 2009. Continued expansion 
in domestic demand and increased external demand led to the strong growth of 10.1% in the 
first quarter of 2010. 
2.  Impact of the banking crisis on bank intermediation 
The financial intermediation process in the Malaysian financial system has remained orderly 
throughout the period of economic turbulence, with continuing flows of credit to the real 
economy. Outstanding loans expanded at an annual rate of 10.1% between July 2007 and 
July 2009. Similarly, outstanding private debt securities (PDS) grew by 10% annually during 
this period. The resilience of the banking system, which accounts for 59.7% of the total 
assets of the financial system, was a critical factor in ensuring the continued flow of funds 
into the economy and providing support to borrowers confronting temporary cash flow 
tightness (Table 1). 
The level of capitalisation of the banking system in Malaysia was at its highest historical level 
at the onset of the crisis. Throughout the period 2007–September 2009, the risk-weighted 
capital ratio (RWCR) and the core capital ratio (CCR) of the banking system in Malaysia 
remained above 12.5% and 9.9%, respectively. Overall profitability as indicated by the return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) was also maintained at an average of 1.6% and 
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20.8% in the period 2007–08, subsequently moderating to 1.2% and 13%, respectively, for 
the period January–September 2009, while remaining in positive territory as business 
conditions slowed significantly in tandem with the general contraction of the Malaysian 
economy. 
During this period, the aggregate credit quality of the banking system’s financing portfolios 
did not experience any significant deterioration. In contrast, total non-performing loans 
(NPLs) declined by 33.4%, while the net NPL ratio improved to 2.1% as at September 2009 
from 4.6% recorded at the beginning of 2007. This can be attributed to the concerted efforts 
taken by the BNM to enhance the credit risk management infrastructure and underwriting 
practices in the period following the Asian financial crisis. In addition, banking institutions 
have been actively managing their balance sheets and asset quality through stringent 
provisioning policies and write-offs of irrecoverable loans. As a result, the financing loss 
coverage ratio for the banking system as a whole rose to about 90% of NPLs (2006: 64.6%) 
as at September 2009.  
Table 1 
Banking system: key financial indicators 
  1996  1997–98  2006  2007  2008  Jan–Sep 
2009 
Number of 




2.8bn 2.1bn 11bn  11.2bn  11.7bn  11.9bn 
Risk-weighted 
capital ratio  10.6% 10.5%  13.5%  13.2% 12.6%  14.5% 
Core capital ratio  9.0% 8.9%  10.7%  10.2% 10.6%  12.9% 
ROA  2.0% –0.9%  1.3%  1.5% 1.5%  1.2% 
ROE  27.5% –12.3%  16.2%  19.8% 18.6%  13.0% 
Net NPL ratio  3.0% 13.2%  4.8%  3.2% 2.2%  2.1% 
Gross NPL ratio  3.9% 18.7%  8.5%  6.5% 4.8%  4.4% 
Financing loss 
coverage ratio  N/A 55.1%  64.6%  77.3% 89.0%  89.7% 
* including nine domestic banking groups and three foreign banking groups. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
In general, the Malaysian banking system entered the current global financial and economic 
crisis from a much stronger position compared to the Asian financial crisis. The consolidation 
and restructuring of the banking industry together with improvements in the governance 
structure, risk management framework, infrastructure and practices, as well as the capacity 
building undertaken as part of the banking sector reforms following the Asian financial crisis, 
have significantly strengthened the foundations for financial stability. Moreover, the 
Malaysian banking system operates within a diversified financial system, with a developed 
capital market. Total bonds outstanding accounted for 86% of GDP, providing an alternative 
funding source for the economy. The funding sources for businesses are evenly balanced 
between the equity and bond markets and the banking sector, thus diversifying credit risk 
concentration away from the banking system, which in turn provides the banking system with 
added capacity to withstand stress and shocks.   
Another factor which prevented excessive risk-taking was the “originate and hold” business 
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institutions’ balance sheets. This served to align incentives with prudent risk-taking and 
ensured that lending institutions continued to vigilantly assess the repayment capacity of 
borrowers and monitor the quality of the loan throughout its tenure. The increase in the risk 
weight of non-performing housing loans to 100% since March 2005 under the regulatory 
capital framework further strengthened incentives for banks to maintain high-quality loan 
portfolios. The legal requirement for all foreign institutions in Malaysia to be locally 
incorporated, with capital committed to support Malaysian operations and obligations, also 
limited any contagion effects of stresses faced by foreign-domiciled parent banks located in 
the countries severely affected by the crisis. 
These combined conditions enabled the banking sector to continue performing its financial 
intermediary role. As at end-September 2009, outstanding loans were growing at an annual 
rate of 7.2%, with a loan approval rate
2 of 71.6% (Table 2). In particular, outstanding loans to 
businesses remained stable, amounting to USD 85.9 billion as at end-September 2009, while 
outstanding loans to households continued to record steady growth. This was also supported 
by the lower cost of financing following the 150 basis point (bp) reduction in the overnight 
policy rate (OPR),
3 which helped to sustain the demand for credit. With consumer confidence 
improving towards the second half of 2009, the purchase of big ticket items such as cars 
rebounded as more consumers took advantage of the lower cost of financing and the 
introduction of newer car models. 
Table 2 
Banking system: outstanding financing 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
Notwithstanding the progressive deterioration of global conditions and the heightened 
uncertainty in the domestic economic outlook, the banking sector in Malaysia was well-
placed to maintain a “business-as-usual” posture with respect to risk management policies 
and standards. Risk mitigation responses were mainly pre-emptive in nature and largely took 
the form of more intensive surveillance and on-the-ground monitoring of small- and medium-
scale borrowers, and the retail segments comprising credit cards and hire purchase facilities 
for cars, which were experiencing a slight uptick in the level of delinquencies. Banking 
institutions were also forthcoming in facilitating the rescheduling or restructuring of debt 
repayment obligations of deserving borrowers facing temporary cash flow constraints. These 
pre-emptive measures prevented premature defaults among such otherwise creditworthy 
borrowers.  
                                                  
2   Loan approval rate = approved loans/(approved loans + rejected loans). 
3   Overnight policy rate = the interest rate set by the BNM at its monetary policy meetings. From November 2008 
to February 2009, the rate was reduced three times from 3.5% to 2%. 
USD billions  Annual change (%)   
Sep 2009  Dec 2008  Sep 2009  Dec 2008 
Total 219.8  209.7  7.2  12.8 
Businesses 85.9  85.4  0.5  13.2 
   Large businesses  51.6  49.3  4.0  16.2 
  SMEs  34.4  36.0  –4.3  9.3 
Households 120.7  113.5  9.1  9.7 270  BIS Papers No 54
 













































































Source: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
To ensure the undisrupted flow of funds to the real sector, the BNM intensified its 
engagements with various stakeholders, including financial institutions, trade associations 
and businesses, beginning as far back as the early part of 2008 when conditions in the global 
economy appeared to be worsening and increasingly fragile. These engagements proved to 
be particularly effective in bridging information gaps between financial institutions and 
businesses, and encouraging a better appreciation among financial institutions of the issues 
facing businesses. This in turn supported the rational credit decisions of financial institutions 
in relation to new and additional facilities as well as requests for the restructuring of 
outstanding facilities. 
3.  Impact on the domestic money and debt markets 
Money market 
Ample liquidity has been maintained in the domestic money market. Activities in the ringgit 
interbank market were unaffected, and the overnight and one-week domestic money market 
rates remained stable, ranging between 1.99% and 2% since April 2009 and within a tight 
spread (Chart 3).   BIS Papers No 54  271
 



































Source: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
The funding structure of the Malaysian banking system is predominantly deposit-based 
(about 70% of total funding) and denominated largely in domestic currency. This is used to 
fund ringgit-denominated assets which support domestic real sector activities. The depositor 
base is equally balanced between wholesale and retail deposits, thus providing greater 
funding stability to banks. The banking system also maintains a comfortable loan-to-deposit 
ratio, which averaged 77.3% for the period July 2007–September 2009. Notably, banking 
institutions are now less dependent on the interbank market compared to the period prior to 
the Asian financial crisis. For most of the period July 2007–September 2009, banking 
institutions were net interbank lenders to the BNM, with average net interbank placements of 
USD 47.1 billion by the banking system, underscoring the ample liquidity in the system. As at 
September 2009, total net interbank placements with the BNM stood at USD 45.3 billion, 
which was available to banks to meet any liquidity needs. 
Banking institutions in Malaysia have, since 1998, been required to comply with dynamic 
minimum liquidity requirements. Under this requirement, all maturing assets and obligations 
are analysed by maturity buckets, with banking institutions required to maintain surplus 
liquidity of 3% for the one-week bucket and 5% for the one-month bucket after taking into 
account historical adverse behaviour assumptions. The overall liquidity buffer of the banking 
system remained well above comfortable minimum levels throughout the period July 2007–
September 2009 (Table 3). In October 2008, as a pre-emptive measure, the BNM’s ringgit 
liquidity facility was extended to all insurance companies and takaful operators to ensure that 
any surge in liquidity needs by insurance companies could be met in the event of an 
unanticipated increase in redemptions or surrenders of insurance policies. No insurance 
company or takaful operator has utilised this facility given the continued stability and 
confidence in the financial system. The extension of the blanket guarantee on all deposits by 
the government in October 2008 also provided added confidence to depositors, averting any 








  Jun 07  Dec 07  Jun 08  Dec 08  Jun 09  Sep 09 
< one week  14.4  15.1  12.9  14.2  16.3  16.4  Liquidity buffer  
(% of total 
deposits)  < one month  18.9  21.2  18.9  16.7  17.7  16.6 
< one week  28.4  31.5  29.1  34.0  39.9  41.5  Liquidity 
surplus 
(USD bn)  < one month  37.3  44.3  42.5  40.2  43.3  41.8 
Net interbank placements with 
the BNM (USD bn)  44.3 49.7 57.3 46.9 46.6 45.2 
Loan-deposit ratio (%)  75.5 76.2 76.0 77.7 78.3 78.9 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
While ringgit liquidity was not a concern, the domestic financial system was affected by the 
global tightening in USD liquidity. The impact was, however, manageable, as holdings of 
USD-denominated assets by Malaysian banking institutions remained small and mostly in 
highly liquid USD treasury assets with exposures partly hedged through currency swaps. As 
at September 2009, the total (on-balance sheet) foreign currency assets of the Malaysian 
banking system stood at USD 24.1 billion, or 6.1% of total assets. In response to the tight 
USD liquidity environment, banking institutions actively trimmed down the size of their foreign 
currency denominated exposures in order to narrow the negative USD mismatch (Chart 4). 
As a result, the cumulative USD liquidity mismatch position of the banking system narrowed 
substantially from the peak observed in November 2008. The BNM also ensured adequate 
USD liquidity to facilitate trade-related transactions. The existence of bilateral and multilateral 
currency swap arrangements with regional countries, including a bilateral currency swap 
arrangement with the People’s Bank of China, further supported the availability of sufficient 
liquidity for intra-regional trade and investment activities. 
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
Cross-currency interest rate swap market 
Developments in the cross-currency interest rate swap (CCIRS) market reflected the global 
shortage of USD liquidity and increased USD borrowing costs. Higher demand for USD in 
early 2008 saw the significant widening of basis spreads with a greater number of BIS Papers No 54  273
 
non-resident issuers turning to the domestic PDS market to take advantage of the overall 
lower cost of funds (Chart 5). Basis spreads normalised after April 2008 as some non-
resident issuers deferred planned issuances of new PDS as rising yields and the higher cost 
of swapping to USD translated into higher overall issuance costs. Basis spreads widened 
further in September and October following the failure of several global financial institutions, 
which resulted in the accumulation of USD assets by global financial institutions and rapid 
deleveraging. This contributed to further USD liquidity tightening in international markets. In 
2009, basis spreads eased but remained at elevated levels.  

































Further USD liquidity 




Debt securities market 
In the domestic capital market, movements in yields were largely dictated by domestic 
considerations. Externally driven factors had a limited impact on yields. 
Government debt market 
Developments in the government bond market in 2008 were influenced mainly by inflation 
expectations following higher commodity prices, the reduction in fuel subsidies by the 
government, and concerns over the growth outlook. Yields trended upwards during the first 
half of 2008 and peaked in the middle of the year anchored by expectations of monetary 
policy tightening. At the same time, the unwinding of portfolio investments by foreign 
investors kept yields at elevated levels. This trend reversed in September 2008 as inflation 
expectations eased substantially and concerns over the growth outlook domestically and 
globally resulted in heightened risk aversion among investors. For the rest of 2008, 
government bond yields continued to trend downwards, consistent with the reduction in the 
policy rate and “flight to quality” behaviour. 
Government bond yields reversed in the early part of 2009, especially at the longer end of 
the curve, due to concerns over the potential oversupply of government bonds following the 
unveiling of two stimulus packages totalling USD 18.3 billion by the government. 
Nonetheless, demand for government debt issuances remained healthy, as evident in the 
firm bid-to-cover ratio for the papers (average HI 2009: 1.85 times, average H1 2008: 
1.98 times). 
High issuance of 
ringgit PDS by 
non-residents 274  BIS Papers No 54
 
Private debt securities market 
Movements in private debt securities (PDS) yields broadly mirrored that of government 
securities during the first half of 2008. In mid-2008, however, announcements on the 
proposed imposition of a windfall tax on independent power producers,
4 the potential 
reduction in toll rates and the possible cap on water concessionaires’ profits, which would 
have affected around 25% of outstanding PDS in the domestic capital market, severely 
dampened investor sentiment. This caused market liquidity to decline and yields to heighten. 
Subsequent communications by the government which clarified the measures, as well as the 
withdrawal of the proposed windfall tax in early September 2009 improved investor 
sentiment, especially for higher-rated issuers. 
Towards the end of 2008 and in early 2009, developments in the PDS market centred on 
concerns over the credit outlook of the corporate sector, leading to the widening of credit 
spreads. As risk aversion heightened, yields, especially for lower-rated PDS (A-rated and 
below), rose significantly (Chart 6). Despite the recent improvements in trading liquidity, 
credit spreads for A-rated PDS remained elevated due to concerns over the credit quality of 
lower-rated issuers. 






































AAA vs MGS A vs MGS (rhs)
 
* MGS = Malaysian government securities. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Bank Negara Malaysia. 
4.  Pre-emptive and comprehensive measures to bolster confidence, 
preserve financial stability and ensure continued access to 
financing 
Given the high degree of interconnectedness between the Malaysian and the global financial 
system, Malaysia acted swiftly to implement pre-emptive and precautionary measures to 
preserve the stability of the financial system and ensure the continuity of credit flows. This 
included specific and targeted measures to preserve confidence and address the highly 
vulnerable segments and potential areas of stress: 
                                                  
4   Independent power producers are privatised power producers, initiated by the government in 1995, to deliver 
the immediate national power security needed to maintain GDP growth. BIS Papers No 54  275
 
  extending a blanket guarantee on all ringgit and foreign currency deposits with 
commercial, Islamic and investment banks and deposit-taking development financial 
institutions regulated by the BNM through the Malaysia Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. The guarantee is in force until December 2010 and extends to all 
domestic and foreign banking institutions operating in Malaysia; 
  extending access to the BNM’s liquidity facility to insurance companies and takaful 
operators regulated and supervised by the BNM; 
  ensuring banks’ accessibility to USD liquidity for trade financing purposes; and 
  intensifying engagement with industry players, businesses and large corporate as 
well as trade bodies.  
Efforts were mainly targeted towards ensuring that businesses and households continued to 
have adequate and uninterrupted access to financing.   
Improving and broadening access to financing 
Support to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
Financing for the SME sector, which accounts for 99% of the total number of business 
establishments in Malaysia, is mainly supported by the domestic banking system. The share 
of SME financing currently accounts for 40% of total business financing granted by the 
banking system (1998: 27.1%). On average, SME financing expanded by 5.9% during the 
period 2007–September 2009. 
The importance of the development of SMEs in supporting domestic-led growth has long 
been a focus of efforts to strengthen the resilience of the Malaysian economy. To this end, 
special funds were established to assist viable SMEs, provide continued support for 
enhancements in efficiency and productivity, and help them manage temporary cash flow 
problems (Table 4).  
The facilities leverage on existing infrastructures and the distribution capabilities of financial 
institutions and special purpose institutions, such as the Credit Guarantee Corporation, 
established in 2005 to provide guarantees enabling SMEs to obtain credit facilities. The 
comprehensive institutional structure and facilities in place for viable SMEs to obtain access 
to financing on competitive terms have had a direct and significant impact on promoting 
financial inclusion in Malaysia as evidenced by Malaysia’s highest global ranking by the 
World Bank for the last three consecutive years in terms of “Getting Credit”.  
As part of ongoing efforts to promote financial inclusion and improve the earning capacity of 
the low-income group, measures have also been taken to develop microfinancing and extend 
its reach and accessibility to wider segments of the population. These efforts have already 
yielded positive results. Outstanding microfinancing has grown by 38.2% annually since its 
inception in 2006, with continued growth in demand for microfinancing. Efforts are continuing 
to improve the accessibility of micro businesses to other financial services such as micro-
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Table 4 
Ensuring continued access to SME financing 
Facility  Amount 
(USD) 
Establi-




200m   Aug 
2008 
To assist viable SMEs facing 
financial difficulties to manage 








To provide financing to SMEs to 
modernise their operations, in 
particular to purchase or upgrade 
machinery and equipment, as well as 







To enhance access to 
microfinancing for micro enterprises 








To assist viable SMEs adversely 
impacted by the economic slowdown 
to continue obtaining access to 
adequate financing  
Replacement 











To assist viable companies with 
shareholder equity of below RM 20 
million to gain access to financing in 
order to maintain their operations 

















To promote investments: 
• that increase productivity; 
• in high-value-added activities (such 
as research and development, and 
downstream agriculture activities); 
and to promote the greater 











the size of  
shareholders’ 
equity 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
Deepening capital market activity 
The development of the Malaysian capital markets was one of the key strategic priorities 
during the 1990s and its importance was further emphasised in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis, especially the importance of diversifying financing sources for the Malaysian 
economy. Led by a broad range of initiatives and policies implemented over the last decade, BIS Papers No 54  277
 
Malaysian capital markets have expanded considerably since the Asian financial crisis. The 
ringgit bond market is now the third largest in Asia, with total bonds outstanding at 86% of 
GDP. The focus on Islamic finance has seen Malaysia emerge as the leading market for 
sukuk issuances (more than 60% of global sukuk outstanding) with a market share of 45% of 
total global issuances recorded for the period January–September 2009. The corporate bond 
market has assumed a significantly more prominent role as an alternative source of financing 
for the corporate sector, accounting for a quarter of total financing as at end-2008 (1997: 
10%). To further enhance access to capital market financing, Malaysia established its first 
financial guarantee institution, Danajamin Berhad, in 2009 to provide credit enhancements to 
viable corporations and businesses.  
Addressing potential borrower distress 
Arrangements and mechanisms to facilitate debt management and develop solutions also 
represent an important component of the supporting framework in Malaysia which ensures 
an orderly intermediation process. These mechanisms serve to avert premature defaults and 
the high cost of resolution of failed companies. In Malaysia, various institutional 
arrangements were established with specific objectives: 
  Credit Counselling and Debt Management Agency. The agency was established 
in 2006 to provide assistance and advice in debt and money management as well as 
financial education to individuals. 
  Small Debt Resolution Scheme (SDRS). The scheme was established in 2003 to 
facilitate loan restructuring and financing solutions for small businesses. In May 
2009, the BNM expanded the scheme to include the debt resolution of distressed 
SMEs with multiple financial institutions. To date, more than 600 SMEs have 
benefited from this scheme. 
  Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC). The voluntary debt 
restructuring mechanism was first established during the Asian financial crisis to 
resolve corporate failures. In July 2009, the Committee was reinstated as a pre-
emptive measure to facilitate corporate debt resolution. Given the structural change 
in the funding composition within the economy, the scope of the CDRC has been 
expanded to cover the restructuring not only of bank borrowings but also of debt 
securities. The expansion of CDRC’s scope so as to cover the bond market is a 
reflection of the importance of the sector in financing the economy. 
Accommodative monetary policy  
The measures to enhance access to financing were also supported by an accommodative 
monetary policy, which was principally aimed at reducing the cost of financing and providing 
support to domestic demand. Since November 2008, the OPR has been lowered by 150 bp 
to 2%. At the same time, the statutory reserve requirement was adjusted downwards by 3 
percentage points to 1% to reduce the cost of intermediation. The monetary easing was also 
supported by a range of initiatives to ensure that the reductions in interest rates were passed 
on to the economy and continued access to credit was available to both existing and new 
borrowers.   
5.  Transformation of the financial system 
The Financial Sector Master Plan unveiled in March 2001 outlined the strategies to develop a 
resilient, diversified and efficient financial sector that not only supports but also contributes 
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reaped as evidenced by the relatively minimal impact of the current financial crisis and the 
continued resilience of the financial sector. The significant development of the Malaysian 
financial services sector over the last decade has spawned new financial innovations and 
services in support of economic activities. Apart from intermediating and supporting 
economic growth, the expansion of the financial sector has also played an instrumental role 
in generating value-added business, attracting investment and creating employment. 
Malaysia has consistently adopted a careful and sequenced approach to financial 
liberalisation, supplemented with sufficient safeguards to ensure that the overall financial 
intermediation function and stability of the financial system remains intact. Supported by the 
progress and achievements of the implementation of the Financial Sector Master Plan, the 
strengthened financial sector fundamentals have positioned the financial sector to seize 
opportunities and embrace a more liberalised and competitive operating environment. In April 
2009, the government announced a liberalisation package that included measures in both 
the conventional and Islamic finance sectors, which will contribute to the further development 
of the Malaysian financial sector and bring net benefits to the economy as a whole, while 
preserving financial stability.  
The liberalisation measures taken by Malaysia are interesting from two aspects. First, the 
further opening up of the domestic market has been pursued amid the global financial crisis. 
Second, the policy was counterintuitive to the prevailing tendencies for countries to adopt 
more protectionist policies in the wake of the crisis. This was possible because of the 
successful reforms implemented in the financial sector in Malaysia. The liberalisation 
package encompasses measures that will significantly boost the financial sector’s 
contribution to growth, including: 
  the introduction of global market leaders and niche players in the domestic market 
through the issuance of new banking licences and takaful licences; 
  higher foreign equity limits for investment banks, insurance companies and takaful 
operators to encourage greater participation of foreign players in domestic 
institutions; and 
  greater operational flexibilities in the establishment of new branches by foreign 
institutions and in the employment of expatriates. 
6. Conclusion 
The impact of the current global crisis on the Malaysian financial sector has remained well 
contained. Efforts following the Asian financial crisis to develop effective regulatory, 
supervisory and surveillance frameworks, as well as the strengthened governance and risk 
management practices and the development of a robust financial infrastructure and safety 
nets have supported a resilient banking system that is well positioned to continue facilitating 
intermediation activities despite the difficult environment. These efforts have been further 
complemented by a more diversified financial system and a higher level of regional 
cooperation and collaboration in responding to crises. Underpinned by the strength of the 
financial system, the management of the current global crisis has focused on pre-emptive 
measures to ensure continued access to financing and to preserve confidence in the 
financial system.  
At the same time, monetary policy has been directed at providing support for domestic 
demand to encourage economic recovery. In addition, fiscal policy measures have provided 
countercyclical support for growth and incentives aimed at stimulating private sector 
consumption and investment. These combined conditions significantly enhance the 
prospects for Malaysia to resume a strong and sustainable growth path once the global 
economic and financial conditions return to normal. 